

Message Text

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SUBJ SALT:HIGHLIGHTS OF OCTOBER 2 POST-MEETING DISCUSSIONS
(SALT TWO -293)

1. SUMMARY. POST-MEETING DISCUSSIONS COVERED SOVIET ICBM PROGRAM, OUTSTANDING US AND SOVIET PROPOSALS, FBS, EQUAL SECURITY INTERESTS AND FUTURE AGREEMENTS. END SUMMARY.

2. SOVIET ICBM PROGRAMS. GRINEVSKY (TO KLOSSON, A-355) ASKED ABOUT US CONCERN RE NEW SOVIET ICBM PROGRAMS SINCE THEY WERE NOT IN VIOLATION OF IA AND US MODERNIZING MINUTEMAN II AND MOVING TOWARD NEW SUBMARINE AND NEW BOMBER. KLOSSON POINTED OUT THAT PRESENT OR PROJECTED US PROGRAMS DO NOT CALL FOR DEVELOPMENT OF FIRST-STRIKE COUNTERFORCE CAPABILITY BUT QUESTIONED WHETHER ONE COULD SAY THE SAME FOR NEW SOVIET ICBM PROGRAMS SINCE THEIR FINAL DEPLOYMENT PLANS WERE UNKNOWN. KLOSSON SAID NEW ICBMS COULD THEORETICALLY SERVE TO UPDATE COMPLETELY SOVIET LAND-BASED MISSILE FORCES, AND THUS PRESERVE THROW-WEIGHT ADVANTAGE AND INTRODUCE QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS. THIS COULD INFLUENCE PERCEPTION OF SURVIVABILITY OF US FORCES AND THUS AFFECT STRATEGIC STABILITY BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

3. SMOLIN (TO GRAYBEAL, A-352) ASKED IF NEW POINTS IN TODAY'S U.S. STATEMENT REFLECTED CHANGE IN US POSITION. IN RESPONSE,
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GRAYBEAL NOTED THAT STATEMENT REINFORCED US POSITIONS BY EMPHA-

SIZING IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO STRATEGIC STABILITY AND SURVIVABILITY OF STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCES. AT SAME TIME, GRAYBEAL UNDERSCORED SERIOUS US CONCERN REGARDING SCOPE, PACE AND NATURE OF NEW SOVIET ICBM PROGRAMS.

4. IN A DISCUSSION OF HEAVY ICBMS, ROWNY ASKED BELETSKY (A-354) IF SEMONOV'S STATEMENT TODAY COULD BE INTERPRETED AS A PROPOSAL TO LIMIT BOTH SIDES TO EQUAL AND REDUCED NUMBERS OF MLBMS. BELETSKY SAID, "NO", THIS WAS NOT A CORRECT INTERPRETATION.

5. IN RESPONSE TO SHCHUKIN'S QUESTION WHETHER US WAS SUGGESTING SOVIET ICBM PROGRAM WAS CONTRARY TO IA, NITZE (A-357) REPLIED IN THE NEGATIVE, NOTING WE HAD EMPHASIZED THAT SOVIET PROGRAM RAISED CONCERN AS TO HOW TO CURB JOINTLY POTENTIALLY DESTABILIZING ELEMENTS OF THE ARMS COMPETITION INVOLVING ICBMS AND ICBM MIRVS.

6. SHCHUKIN SAID THAT MISSILE SYSTEMS HAD A CERTAIN LIMITED LIFE TIME. IT WAS NECESSARY, FROM TIME TO TIME, TO REPLACE THEM; IT TOOK TIME TO SO DO. THE REPLACEMENT SYSTEMS WHICH THEY WERE DEVELOPING CORRESPONDED TO THE SYSTEMS WHICH THEY ALREADY HAD DEPLOYED. NITZE SAID THAT IT WAS QUITE CLEAR THAT NEITHER SIDE COULD LIVE WITH EITHER THE REALITY OR THE APPEARANCE OF INFERIORITY IN A STRATEGIC FIELD AS IMPORTANT AS THAT OF ICBMS. THE US PROPOSAL FOR STRATEGIC EQUIVALENCE IN CENTRAL SYSTEMS ACCEPTED THE POSSIBILITY THAT THERE NEED NOT BE PRECISE EQUALITY IN EACH ASPECT OF THE CENTRAL SYSTEMS, BUT OVERALL THERE MUST BE THE REALITY AND APPEARANCE OF EQUIVALENCE. IT APPEARED TO NITZE THAT THERE WERE THREE LOGICAL APPROACHES; ONE WOULD BE AN ICBM MIRV FREEZE OFFSETTING A CERTAIN ADVANTAGE IN NUMBERS OR THROW-WEIGHT; ANOTHER WOULD BE FOR REDUCTIONS, OVER TIME, ON THE SIDE HAVING THE GREATER POTENTIAL; THE THIRD WOULD BE FOR THE SIDE HAVING A LESSER POTENTIAL TO UNDERTAKE ADDITIONAL PROGRAMS TO ACHIEVE EQUIVALENCE. SHCHUKIN SAID THAT HE THOUGHT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEIR SIDE TO REDUCE, EVEN OVER TIME, MISSILE SYSTEMS ONCE DEPLOYED.

7. OUTSTANDING US AND SOVIET PROPOSALS. IN REPLY TO GRAYBEAL'S QUESTIONS (A-352) AS TO WHEN SOVIET SIDE WOULD RESPOND TO SPECIFIC US PROPOSALS, SMOLIN LIKENED THE US PROPOSALS TO FOUR "BLOCKS" RESTING UPON U.S. DIVISION OF "STRATEGIC" FORCES INTO "CENTRAL
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AND NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS". SMOLIN SAID SOVIET SIDE COULD NOT ACCEPT THIS APPROACH; THUS THE FOUNDATION WAS INADEQUATE AND THE BLOCKS "CRUMBLED". AS TO FUTURE STATEMENTS, SMOLIN SAID THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD HAVE MORE TO SAY ON QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS AND REDUCTIONS BUT "WE CANNOT PRESENT EVERYTHING IN ONE STATEMENT".

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8. BELETSKY (TO FITZGERALD, A-356) SAID SEMENOV'S STATEMENT TODAY WAS NOT A USSR PROPOSAL BUT AN EXPLANATION OF THE SOVIET APPROACH AND POSITION WHICH WOULD FORM THE BASIS FOR A PERMANENT AGREEMENT. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE STATEMENT WAS AN INDIRECT AND INCOMPLETE RESPONSE TO THE U.S. PROPOSAL FOR EQUAL AGGREGATES ON ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS. HE INDICATED THAT ADDITIONAL SOVIET RESPONSES TO THE REMAINING ELEMENTS OF THAT U.S. PROPOSAL WOULD BE MADE SHORTLY.

9. FBS. IN RESPONSE TO SMOLIN'S QUESTION AS TO WHETHER HE AWARE OF THE DANGER POSED THE SOVIET POPULATION AND INDUSTRIAL BASE BY US FBS, GRAYBEAL (A-352) POINTED OUT THAT 50 PERCENT OF THE US POPULATION AND A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF ITS INDUSTRIAL BASE WAS WITHIN RANGE OF SOVIET SUB-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES. SMOLIN IMMEDIATELY DROPPED THE SUBJECT. TURNING TO SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR WITHDRAWAL, SMOLIN EMPHASIZED SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER ALTERNATIVE WITHDRAWAL PHASES OR MORE PHASES. GRAYBEAL NOTED THAT SOVIET WITHDRAWAL PROPOSALS CALLED FOR UNILATERAL US ACTION WITH NO COMPARABLE SOVIET ACTION. U.S. MAY 15 NON-CIRCUMVENTION FORMULA TOOK INTO ACCOUNT SOVIET PROPOSALS AND PROVIDED A DEFINITIVE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS. SMOLIN TERMED US PROPOSAL A "FREEZE" OF THE CURRENT SITUATION WHICH IN ITSELF WAS UNACCEPTABLE BUT WHICH MIGHT BE OF INTEREST IF ACCOMPANIED BY CERTAIN PHASED WITHDRAWALS. WHEN SMOLIN NOTED THAT U.S. SENATE ACTION HAD STARTED A U.S.

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WITHDRAWAL, GRAYBEAL INTERRUPTED TO STATE THAT NEITHER SMOLIN NOR ANYONE ON SOVIET DELEGATION SHOULD RELY ON US SENATE TO IMPLEMENT SOVIET WITHDRAWAL PROPOSALS, SINCE U.S. SENATE WILL NOT WITHDRAW U.S. ARMS NECESSARY TO SUPPORT OUR ALLIES.

10. EQUAL SECURITY INTERESTS. GRINEVSKY (TO KLOSSON, A-355) WONDERED WHETHER U.S. SEP 28 STATEMENT THAT EQUAL SECURITY INTERESTS ENCOMPASS SECURITY INTERESTS OF ALLIES SIGNALLED US INTENTION TO INTRODUCE SUBJECT OF THIRD COUNTRIES INTO SALT TALKS OR WAS IT ONLY GENERAL DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES. IN SOVIET VIEW, FIRST WAS UNACCEPTABLE WHILE SECOND WOULD BE UNDERSTANDABLE SINCE USSR HAS NO LESS DESIRE RE SECURITY INTERESTS OF ITS ALLIES. KLOSSON REMINDED GRINEVSKY THAT WE HAD MADE CLEAR LAST JUNE THAT US DOES NOT SEPARATE ITS SECURITY INTERESTS FROM THOSE OF ITS ALLIES. AS FAR AS SALT IS CONCERNED, WE RECOGNIZE ITS BILATERAL NATURE, WE HAVE NO LICENSE OR INTENTION TO SPEAK FOR THIRD COUNTRIES, AND SOVIET SIDE HAD IN FACT INTRODUCED SUBJECT OF THIRD COUNTRIES IN SALT.

11. FUTURE AGREEMENTS. BELETSKY (TO ROWNY, A-354) SAID THAT THE IA SHOULD SERVE AS THE FOUNDATION UPON WHICH TO BUILD A SUPER-STRUCTURE OF AGREEMENTS OF A PERMENENT NATURE FOR OTHER ITEMS. ROWNY REPLIED THAT SOVIET SIDE WOULD BE MISTAKEN TO ASSUME THAT THE INEQUALITIES IN THE IA WOULD BE PERPETUATED IN A PERMANENT AGREEMENT.

12. BELETSKY THEN SAID NUMBERS OF ICBMS, SLBMS, AND SUBMARINES WERE IMPORTANT AND LIMITS SHOULD BE PUT ON THEM. ROWNY NOTED THAT AGREED NUMBERS IN A PERMANENT AGREEMENT DEPENDED UPON AGREEMENTS REACHED ON THROW-WEIGHT AND OTHER QUALITATIVE FACTORS WHICH, TOGETHER WITH EQUAL CEILINGS ON TOTAL NUMBERS OF ICBMS, SLBMS, AND HEAVY BOMBERS, WOULD ADD UP TO ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE.

13. SHCHUKIN (TO NITZE, A-357) ASKED WHETHER ARTICLE VII POSITIVELY PROHIBITED AGREEMENT ON THE TERMS CONTAINED IN THE INTERIM AGREEMENT; WAS NOT THIS POSSIBILITY LEFT OPEN? NITZE SAID THAT THE POSSIBILITY WAS NOT FORECLOSED, BUT THAT IT WOULD REQUIRE A SEPARATE DECISION IN AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT CONTEXT. SHCHUKIN DID NOT DISAGREE, BUT RAISED THE LINKAGE OF THIS QUESTION WITH FORWARD BASED SYSTEMS. JOHNSON

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